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Abstract: 
Virtual water trade  is  increasingly recognized as a  useful  metaphor  for thinking about 
freshwater  resources  in  an  international  context.    Its  legitimacy  in  terms  of  economic 
theory has been questioned by a number of authors, however.  In this article I develop new 
theoretical results that place the virtual water concept on a firm economic foundation, and 
which  correct  several  misconceptions  within  the  existing  literature  on  virtual  water 
economics. 
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On the Economics of Virtual Water Trade 
1.  Introduction 
Allan  (1997,  1998)  argues  that  the  import  of  water-intensive  commodities  by  Middle 
Eastern countries has helped alleviate water shortages in that region, and thereby helps 
explain the absence of a long-predicted major conflict over water.  He refers to the import 
of products that require a lot of water in their production as trade in “virtual water,” and 
suggests that it provides a means to meet the growing consumption needs of countries that 
are otherwise short of water.  This  idea has gone on to stimulate much debate among 
scientists, academics, and government policymakers.  There is much controversy among 
economists, in particular, regarding the language and theoretical grounding of the concept 
(Allan, 2003; Merrett, 2003; Ansink, 2010; Hoekstra, 2010). 
Although the idea of virtual water trade is an inherently economic concept, it did 
not originate within the economics literature, and economists as a whole have arguably 
been slow to recognize and appreciate it.  When economists have recognized it, however, it 
has often been in the form of a critique.  It is the point of this article to correct some 
misconceptions within this literature.  I ultimately show that the concept has a great deal of 
legitimacy when viewed from the perspective of standard international trade theory.  Any 
empirical  failures associated with the concept – summarized recently  in this  journal  in 
Ansink (2010) – are due not to weak theoretical support for the concept, but to deviations 
from the assumptions underlying the theoretical model. 
Merrett (1997) was one of  the  first economists  to write explicitly about virtual 
water.  Merrett argues that virtual water is merely a “metaphor,” although a “powerful” and 
“creative” one.  He uses the term metaphor because the water content of imported grain is   2 
necessarily much less than the totality of water that was used to grow the grain.  The term 
“virtual water” does not adequately recognize  this distinction,  in  his opinion.  Writing 
later, Merrett (2003) recommends in even stronger terms that the phrase “the import of 
virtual water” not be used; rather, it should be replaced with the phrase “the import of 
food.”  In this study I will argue that this is a step too far, as it overlooks a very long 
tradition in international economics of viewing trade as the international exchange of the 
services of factors embodied in goods (Davis and Weinstein, 2003).  Instead of saying 
“import of food,” which eliminates any reference to water, I will argue that we should refer 
to virtual water trade as “import of the services of water.”  While a bit awkward, this is 
consistent  with  phrasing  developed  long  ago  by  international  trade  economists  who 
wrestled with this basic issue in another context. 
Another source of contention regards how the concept of virtual water trade fits 
with the economic theory of comparative advantage.   Wichelns (2004) criticizes  Allan 
(2003) and Lant (2003) for drawing too close a parallel between virtual water trade and 
comparative advantage.  Wichelns argues that the concepts are not analogous because the 
virtual water concept “addresses resource endowments, but it does not address production 
technologies or opportunity costs.”   In other words, a country’s relative water endowment 
is not the only factor that influences trade patterns, even for goods that require a great deal 
of water in their production.  In this study I argue that the virtual water concept is indeed a 
descendent of comparative advantage theory.  Relative water endowments are indeed a 
potential source of comparative advantage.  However, I will argue that the comparative 
advantage associated with relative water endowments is often latent.  It is not so much 
obscured by international technology differences, as Wichelns seems to posit, but by very   3 
high trade costs in the sector with the most virtual water trade: agriculture.  These all but 
swamp any comparative advantage that may arise from relative water endowments. 
A third source of contention is associated with Ansink (2010), who argues that a 
number  of  claims  made  by  Allan  and  others  are  only  weakly  supported  by  standard 
economic arguments.  Indeed, Ansink provides what may be the most rigorous critique of 
claims that have been made in the virtual water trade literature.  He does this in the context 
of  an  explicit,  well-defined  model:  the  Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson  model  of  trade 
(Heckscher,  1919;  Ohlin,  1933;  Samuelson,  1949).    He  argues  that  the  virtual  water 
concept  has  been  “incorrectly  used  to  make  certain  claims  that  are  not  in  line  with 
empirical  facts and standard economic theory.”   He suggests that the Heckscher-Ohlin 
trade  theorem  provides  only  very  tenuous  support  for  virtual  water  trade.  This  is 
important, because if this theory does not provide support, it is unlikely that any other 
theory will be able to.
1  In this study I challenge two of Ansink’s specific claims.  One of 
them no longer holds, for example, when one accounts for a country’s spending constraint, 
which constrains how much a given country can possibly import from another. 
In  carrying  out these  tasks,  I  hope to  eliminate  some  of  theoretical  uncertainty 
surrounding the legitimacy of virtual water trade.  I demonstrate that proper application of 
international trade theory casts a very favorable light on the concept itself.  At the same 
time, it must be acknowledged – as Ansink (2010) has emphasized – that the concept does 
not always hold up very well when tested empirically.  I argue, however, that any weak 
                                                 
1  This  is  not  to  suggest  that  the  Heckscher-Ohlin  model  is  the  only  model  available  to  explore  issues 
involving international trade and water.  A potential shortcoming is its implicit assumption that there exist 
well-defined and enforced property rights, when this is not often the case for water.  An alternative approach 
is offered by Chichilnisky (1994), for example, who shows how differences in property rights between two 
countries can create a motive for trade among otherwise identical regions.   4 
evidence regarding the importance of water as a determinant of trade is not due to weak 
theoretical  support,  as  appears  to  have  been  suggested  by  Ansink.    Rather,  any  weak 
performance  arises  when  real  world  situations  deviate  from  the  assumptions  of  the 
standard trade model. 
 
2. The algebra of virtual water trade 
I first present in formal detail how virtual water trade can be conceptualized within an 
economic  framework, to  ensure  that  subsequent  arguments  can  be  evaluated  in  proper 
context.  The simplest way to do this is with a basic Heckscher-Ohlin trade model in which 
there are two countries, two factors (capital and water), and two goods.  In this context, the 
Heckscher-Ohlin  theorem  is  that  the  relatively  water-abundant  country  will  export  the 
water-intensive good, and the relatively capital-abundant country will export the capital-
intensive good.  I think it critical that this is proven so that my corollaries can be properly 
understood. 
In the tradition of international trade models, let there be two countries: Home and 
Foreign.    I  will  present  notation  for  the  home  country  variables,  with  corresponding 
variables for the foreign country having an asterisk (*) beside it.  Let  1 c  and  2 c  denote the 
quantity that home consumes of goods 1 and 2, and  1 y  and  2 y  denote the quantity that 
home produces of goods 1 and 2.  There are two factor inputs that are internationally 
immobile: L (water) and K (capital), with associated factor prices w and r.  There is perfect 
competition in product markets and factor markets, and identical and homothetic tastes 
across countries.  Free trade in goods and no transportation costs ensure that prices of the 
two goods,  1 p  and  2 p , are equalized across countries, such that 
*
11 pp   and 
*
22 pp  .   5 
For  goods  1,2 i  ,  firms  choose  , ii LK   to  minimize  costs  ii wL rK    subject  to 
constant-returns production technology  ( , ) i i i f L K .  Conditional factor demands for water 
and capital corresponding to one unit of production are:  
1 1 1 ( , ) L L y a w r       2 2 2 ( , ) L L y a w r       1 1 1 ( , ) K K y a w r       2 2 2 ( , ) K K y a w r   
The term  1L a , for example, refers to the amount of water (L) needed to produce one unit of 
good  1.    Remaining  input-output  coefficients  are  interpreted  similarly.    Although  unit 
factor demands are conditional on factor prices, this dependency does not play a role in 
what  follows, and  factor price  notation  is  henceforth suppressed.  Identical technology 
implies that the  1L a ,  2L a ,  1K a , and  2K a  coefficients are the same across countries. 
Assuming  positive  production  of  both  goods, there  are  two  sets of  equilibrium 
conditions.  First are zero profit conditions (due to free entry): 
1 1 1 LK a w a r p  , 
2 2 2 LK a w a r p  . 
Second are factor market clearing conditions: 
1 1 2 2 LL a y a y L  , 
1 1 2 2 KK a y a y K  . 
For concreteness, assume that the home country is relatively water abundant: 
*
*
LL
KK
 , 
and that good 1 is water intensive for all combinations of factor prices (no factor intensity 
reversals): 
12
12
LL
KK
aa
aa
 .   6 
Using the above framework, it can be shown that home produces relatively more good 1 
than is consumed: 
11
22
yc
yc
 , 
while in the foreign country relatively less good 1 is produced than is consumed: 
**
11
**
22
yc
yc
 . 
Given  the  goods  market  clearing  conditions,  in  equilibrium  we  must  have  that  home 
imports  good  2    and  exports  good  1.  This  result  is  the  Heckscher-Ohlin  theorem, 
formalized by Samuelson (1949).  Denoting home’s exports of good 1 as  1 X , and home’s 
imports of good 2 as  2 M , we have that: 
222 0 M c y     
1 1 1 0 X y c     
The  foreign  country  exports  good  2  (
* * *
2 2 2 0 X y c    )  and  imports  good  1 
(
***
1 1 1 0 M c y    ). 
 
3. Contention one: A relatively water-abundant country can be a net water importer 
The above result is just the textbook version of the Heckscher-Ohlin model, and has not 
been contested within the virtual water literature.  Ansink (2010), however, states that the 
Heckscher-Ohlin theorem is “powerless when the export of virtual water embedded in the 
water-intensive good is offset by the import of a sufficient amount of the capital-intensive 
good.  Although country 1 exports the water-intensive good, it would still be a net importer 
of virtual water.”  He is concerned that a small country with relative abundance in water   7 
may import such a great quantity of the non-water-intensive good 2 that it ends up being a 
net importer of water.   
Could this really happen?  I will prove that the answer is “no” unless a nation’s 
citizens are allowed to spend more than they earn as income – a scenario that is generally 
ruled out in trade models, including the Heckscher-Ohlin model.  This corollary is a new 
result, as far as I can discern, within the international trade literature, although it may not 
come as a great surprise to those who are steeped in that literature.  In proving that the 
export of water embedded in the water-intensive good will never be offset by the water 
contained in the imported capital-intensive good, it is convenient use the concept of the 
“factor content” of consumption, production, and trade.  This term has a long history in 
international economics (Davis and Weinstein, 2003), yet international trade economists 
have not always been explicit in what is meant by “factor content.”  I will use this term to 
refer to the total amount of a factor necessary to produce a good, which is likely to be more 
than the amount of a factor that a good contains when consumed in its final form.  In the 
case of water, the water content of good 1 refers to the amount of water used throughout 
the production and distribution process to bring the product to final form. 
For the home country in autarky, the water content of production is  12 L L L  .  
This is because home consumption in autarky of the two goods is  11 cy   and  22 cy  .  
When we multiply  1 y  and  2 y  through by the amount of water necessary to produce the 
two  goods,  we  get:  1 1 2 2 LL a y a y  ,  which  is  equal  to  L  by  the  factor  market  clearing 
conditions. 
Now what happens to home water consumption when there is international trade 
with the foreign country?  We showed above that home consumption of the two goods   8 
under  trade  is  1 1 1 c y X   and  2 2 2 c y M  ,  respectively.  The  water  content  of 
consumption  under  trade  is  found  by  multiplying  through  by  the  amount  of  water 
necessary to produce the goods: 
    1 1 1 2 2 2 LL a y X a y M    1 1 2 2 LL L a X a M    , 
where we have made use of the factor market clearing condition, again.  At this point it 
appears that the water content of consumption under trade ( 1 1 2 2 LL L a X a M  ) could be 
higher  or  lower  than  the  water  content  of  consumption  with  no  trade  (L),  due  to  the 
presence of both positive and negative terms on the right-hand side.  In other words, the 
theorem  appears  “powerless”  at  this  stage,  to  use  the  adjective  of  Ansink  (2010).  
However, the size of  2 M  is constrained by the need to pay for the imports.  In particular, 
there is a home budget constraint: 
1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 pc p c p y p y    , 
that says that money spent (given by the left-hand side) equals money earned (the right-
hand side).  An equality sign (as opposed to a less-than-or-equal sign) is used here because 
strict monotonicity of preferences implies that all income is spent.
2  The above relationship 
can be restated using our previously defined expressions for exports of good 1 ( 1 X ) and 
imports of good 2 ( 2 M ): 
1 1 2 2 p X p M  , 
or simply:  
1
21
2
p
MX
p
 . 
                                                 
2  Any  unspent  income  could  be  used  to  buy  extra  consumption;  with  positive  marginal  utilities,  more 
consumption would lead to more satisfaction.  Hence it is never optimal to have unspent income.     9 
Substituting this in for  2 M  up above, the water content of consumption under trade is then: 
1
1 1 2 1
2
LL
p
L a X a X
p
  
1
1 2 1
2
LL
p
L X a a
p

   

. 
Again it looks as if home’s water content of consumption under trade could be higher or 
lower than the water content of consumption with no trade.  However, the  zero profit 
conditions allow us to resolve the ambiguity.  Let us ratio them as: 
1 1 1
2 2 2
LK
LK
p a w a r
p a w a r



, 
and substitute them in for  
1
2
p
p
 up above.  With a bit of rearranging this gives: 
  2 1 1 2
1
22
L K L K
LK
a a a a r
LX
a w a r



. 
This  expression  as  a  whole  is  strictly  less  than  L  because  the  term  in  parenthesis  is 
negative.   It is negative because  2 1 1 2 L K L K a a a a   due to the assumption about which good 
is water intensive.  The conclusion is that the water content of consumption of the country 
with relative abundance is unambiguously lower once countries start to trade.  Since the 
water content of production must stay the same, the home country must be a net exporter 
of water, unambiguously. 
The  foreign  country  must  then  be  a  net  importer  of  water,  unambiguously.  
However much home imports good 2, it can’t import so much that it becomes a net water 
importer.  To summarize, since a country needs to pay for its imports (that is, since there is 
a spending constraint), Ansink’s concern is unfounded. 
 
4. Contention two: It is “confusing” to suggest that water is being traded   10 
As noted in the introduction, Merrett (2003) calls out for an end to the term virtual water, 
suggesting that the phrase “import of virtual water” be replaced by “the import of food.”  
Allan (2003) accepts this concern and agrees that, indeed, it is “confusing to suggest that 
water was being traded in the process of moving water intensive commodities, such as 
grain, from one place to another.” 
However, to suggest that “water is being traded” is consistent with a large branch 
of international trade theory that has developed over decades.  The idea that goods are just 
bundles of the services of the factors used to make them, traces its origin at least as far 
back as Vanek’s (1968) extension of the Heckscher-Ohlin model to multiple goods and 
factors.  He shows that many new results are available when one works in terms of the 
“factor content of trade” as opposed to trade in goods themselves.
3  The factor content of a 
country’s trade is calculated as the factor content of its consumption less the factor content 
of its production, where “factor content” is the total amount of a factor used in production 
of a good.  Under this concept, international trade takes place in the services of factors 
such as capital, labor, and water. 
Under the perspective of the Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek model, we need not do as 
Merrett (2003) suggests, which is to replace the phrase “import of virtual water” with “the 
import of food.”  Instead of writing the “import of virtual water” we can write “import of 
the services of water.”  In this light, goods trade is but a superficial view of what is really 
happening: the international exchange of the services of productive factors such as capital, 
labor, land, and water. 
                                                 
3 When countries have more than two factors of production, it may not be possible to predict trade patterns in 
goods, but it is possible to predict the factor content of trade.  Vanek’s generalization of Heckscher-Ohlin 
theory allows  for any number of productive  factors (F) and goods (N).  It requires only  one additional 
assumption: specialization by a country in no more than N-F products (Vanek, 1968).   11 
 
5. Contention three: There may not be a “leveling” of water around the world 
Ansink (2010) observes that the Vanek theorem implies that the country that is relatively 
abundant in water will be a net exporter of water-intensive products.  Ansink goes on to 
observe that a special case could occur: if Home has more water in a relative sense, yet 
Foreign has more water in an absolute sense, then Home will be exporting water to a 
country that has more water.  For this reason Ansink suggests that a so-called “leveling” of 
freshwater resources around the world  may not occur.  He contests the claim of Allan 
(1997) that “the mechanisms of international trade in staple foods continue to operate with 
proven effectiveness to ameliorate the uneven water endowments of the world’s regions.”  
He also takes issue with  Hoekstra and Hung’s (2005) observation that “…  high water 
scarcity will make it attractive to import virtual water and thus become water dependent.  
One  would  logically  suppose:  the  higher  the  scarcity  within  a  country,  the  more 
dependency on water in other countries.” 
  The  problem  with  Ansink’s  argument  is  that  if  Foreign  has  more  water  in  an 
absolute sense but not a relative sense, then it must have more capital in an absolute, as 
well as relative sense.  It is therefore essentially a “larger” country.  In particular, it is a 
large country that has a lot of water but consumes relatively little water compared to the 
rest of the world. 
It  is  important  to  develop  this  argument  formally.    The  factor  content  of 
consumption for the foreign country in autarky is just its endowment of factors 
* V .  Water 
is scarce relative to the other country (or countries).  With identical homothetic preferences 
and identical goods prices via trade, foreign’s demand for goods is just its income share of   12 
world net output: 
* W s Y .  But what is its factor content of consumption?  This can be found 
by way of the relevant conditional factor demands summarized in the so-called techniques 
matrix, A.  The factor content of consumption is simply:  
 
* W s AY  = 
* W s V , 
where  
W V  is the world endowment vector, and 
WW  AY V  due to factor market clearing.  
The key point is that Foreign’s new water content of consumption under trade is a fraction 
of the world endowment of all water and capital, which is necessarily more water intensive 
than foreign’s own factor endowment.  So under trade, the large foreign country (with 
more water in an absolute sense) goes from consuming a relatively low amount of water 
(as given by an element of 
* V ), to consuming water in the same proportion as found in the 
rest of the world (as given by an element of 
* W s V ). 
To ensure clarity, it’s useful to illustrate the principle using numbers, yet in a way 
that does not sacrifice its general nature.  Assume that before trade, the factor content of 
consumption for Home happens to be four parts water to one part capital: 
20
5
L
K
 
  
V . 
Meanwhile, the factor content of consumption for Foreign is six parts water to nine parts 
capital before trade: 
*
*
*
30
45
L
K
 

 
V . 
I  have  made  up  numbers  that  give  foreign  relative  water  scarcity,  yet  absolute  water 
abundance.  After trade, both countries consume a fraction of the world endowment vector, 
which is one part water to one part capital:   13 
* 50
50
W 
  

V V V . 
One  part  water  to  one  part  capital  clearly  lies  in  the  middle  of  the  previous  factor 
consumption bundles of these two countries.  The implication is that even though Foreign 
has absolutely more water in its endowment, its factor consumption profile is becoming 
much more like Home’s.  So if one looks at the water content of consumption – which is 
the appropriate measure in the Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek model – then water consumption is 
indeed becoming more “even” around the world.  On the basis of this analysis, which is 
entirely standard as trade theory goes, Hoekstra and Hung (2005) and Allan (1997) cannot 
be said to be incorrect, as Ansink has claimed. 
 
6. Contention four: Virtual water trade is unrelated to comparative advantage 
Wichelns (2004) emphasizes that virtual water trade is not the same thing as comparative 
advantage.  However, our exposition of the Heckscher-Ohlin framework should make clear 
that water is a potential source of comparative advantage.  We should not be surprised, 
however, if water is not a major determinant of trade patterns.  Trade economists typically 
leave  water  off  lists  of  the  determinants  of  international  trade  patterns  because  water 
usually  has  a  small  share  of  production  costs.    This  is  true  even  for  agricultural 
commodities, since rain falling on crop fields costs nothing, and irrigation water (when 
used) tends to be either underpriced from a societal point of view, or not priced at all. 
Wichelns  (2004)  seems  to  imply  that  technology  differences  are  of  particular 
importance for explaining trade in water-intensive commodities.  Certainly, international 
technology differences can matter quite a lot in crop agriculture, for example.  There exist 
very restrictive technical- and policy-related barriers to international technology diffusion   14 
in this particular sector (Ruttan, 2001).  But it would seem that high trade costs are even 
more important, as policy-related trade barriers in crop agriculture are often quite high.  
For example, global average bound tariffs in agriculture are roughly double those in other 
sectors (Reimer and Li, 2010).  Reimer and Li (2010) show that freight costs are  also 
particularly  high  in  this  sector.    These  barriers  can  only  obscure  the  roles  of  water 
availability and technology as determinants of trade patterns. 
A summary of empirical evidence on the virtual water trade hypothesis can be found 
in Ansink (2010).  As might be expected – given the above arguments – relative water 
abundance does not consistently make a good predictor of trade flows in water-intensive 
products.  However, I do not interpret this as evidence that virtual water trade has limited 
support  from  theoretical  trade  models.    Rather,  I  think  it  simply  implies  that  the 
Heckscher-Ohlin trade model does not account for everything that matters for a real world 
analysis of trade flows. 
 
7. Conclusions 
A number of economists have expressed reservations regarding whether virtual water trade 
is a  legitimate economic concept and whether  it accords with  longstanding knowledge 
about the international economy and comparative advantage.  I have attempted to address 
some of these uncertainties in this article, and hope that researchers will push forward with 
analysis  of  what  might  be  called  “trade  in  the  services  of  water,”  or  “trade  in  water 
services.”  This type of phrase has a long history of use by international trade economists, 
and recognizes that in trading goods across national borders, we are effectively trading the 
services of water that was used to produce the goods.   15 
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